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Abstract 
 
 This paper examines delivery of public health care 
services in India, in the broader context of 
decentralization. It provides an overview of the basic 
features and recent developments in intergovernmental 
fiscal relations and accountability mechanisms, and 
examines the implications of these institutions for the 
quality of public service delivery> It then addresses 
recent policy proposals on the public provision of health 
care, in the context of decentralization. Finally, it 
makes suggestions for reform priorities to improve public 
health care delivery. 
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1. Introduction 
India spends about 5 percent of its GDP on health 
care: the official figure is a little over 6 percent, but a 
comprehensive health expenditure accounting exercise put 
the figure at 4.6 percent in 2001-02 (Government of India, 
2005). This proportion is roughly in line with developing 
countries at similar income levels. Where India appears to 
be an outlier is in the proportion of health spending that 
is undertaken in the public sector. At about 20 percent, 
the Indian figure is well below most other countries. Of 
course, the ultimate test is in terms of outcomes. Here, 
also, India does rather poorly: it has failed to do as well 
in health care outcomes as might be predicted by its 
average income level. This relative performance stands in 
contrast to China, for example (Table 1), which does better 
than average. 
Policy makers have naturally been concerned by India’s 
relative failure in achieving good health outcomes, and 
spending more on health has been one solution that has been 
explored. Another issue is the quality of the spending that 
already takes place. The lack of proper incentives for 
delivery of public health services is widely recognized as 
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 a factor in spending quality, and changes in delivery 
mechanisms have been proposed to tackle that problem.  
For example, in 2001, India’s Planning Commission 
directly linked solving the major incentive problems in 
public delivery of health care to the process of 
decentralization: “One of the major factors responsible for 
poor performance in hospitals is the absence of personnel 
of all categories who are posted there. It is essential 
that there is appropriate delegation of powers to 
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) [rural local 
governments] so that there is local accountability of the 
public health care providers, and problems relating to poor 
performance can be sorted out locally” (Planning 
Commission, 2001). The question is whether and how 
decentralization can improve public sector delivery of 
health care in India, and that is the focus of this paper. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 discusses the nature of health care services, and 
summarizes the pattern of public sector health spending in 
India. Section 3 reviews the basic features of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, recent developments, 
and accountability mechanisms for the provision of 
subnational public goods. Section 4 examines the impacts of 
the intergovernmental system and accountability mechanisms 
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 on the quality of public service delivery, including health 
care. Section 5 specifically addresses recent public policy 
proposals on the provision of health care, in the context 
of decentralization. Section 6 offers a concluding 
assessment with suggestions for reform priorities to 
improve public health care delivery. 
 
2. Health Care in India  
Within the broader context of public service delivery, 
health care has several special features. More so than any 
other public good, health care has the characteristics of a 
“credence” good, where neither pre-consumption search nor 
actual experience is sufficient to reveal the quality of 
the service provided to the recipient. This property 
implies that market provision is subject to severe 
potential problems associated with asymmetries of 
information.1  A related issue is the complexity of health 
care, which makes information exchange and the 
establishment of reputations more difficult.  Hence, 
private and public provision of health care are both likely 
to be subject to inefficiencies and quality problems. 
Indeed, there is evidence of these problems even for well-
off urban consumers in India (Das and Hammer, 2005, 2007) 
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 as well as in poor rural areas (Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo, 
2004a,b). 
Health care is also distinguished by the diversity of 
services that are covered by the term. Care may involve 
prevention or treatment of disease, treatment may be for 
acute or chronic problems, health problems may be 
exclusively individual or have collective dimensions, be 
specific to particular groups (e.g., children or women) 
and, increasingly, health care includes attention to 
broader aspects of well-being. From an economic policy 
perspective, the key issues are the degree of “publicness” 
or spillovers associated with each component of health 
care, the minimum efficient scale for provision, and the 
potential for economies of scope, either in costs or 
benefits. 
The heterogeneity of health care services means that 
it is useful to break down the pattern of spending in this 
category. Furthermore, differences in spillovers and scale 
economies for different services may favor organizing 
provision at alternative levels of government. Table 2 
provides basic data on patterns of public sector health 
spending in India. It can be seen that the states undertake 
the bulk of public spending on health. The figures for 
local government are probably overstated, and include 
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 spending that is effectively determined by state 
governments. In addition, health care workers are almost 
always state employees. Other points of note are the 
importance at all levels of curative spending, and the high 
proportionate cost of administration in urban areas. The 
latter undoubtedly is a function of the fact that running 
large hospitals is a major component of urban health 
spending. 
It is impossible to infer too much from such aggregate 
figures, with respect to whether the observed pattern of 
spending is in some sense the “right” one. Certainly, there 
is clear conceptual understanding among policymakers of the 
multifaceted nature of health care, the need to make 
spending decisions at the appropriate scale, and the 
problems of poor incentives in the current system. However, 
before tackling the possible linking of fiscal 
decentralization and improvements in public delivery of 
health care services, it is necessary to review the 
institutional framework. 
 
3. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations2  
India contains multiple languages, religions and 
ethnicities, and over one billion people. It has sustained 
a working democracy for six decades at relatively low 
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 levels of income, and is also distinguished by its 
institutional richness and the relative stability of these 
institutions (Kapur, 2005). The Indian constitution 
explicitly incorporates a federal structure, with states as 
subnational entities that are assigned specified political 
and fiscal authorities. The constitution gives the central 
government residual authority and considerable sovereign 
discretion over the states, implying a relatively 
centralized federation. 
 
Institutions 
The main expression of statutory constitutional 
authority is through directly elected parliamentary-style 
governments at the national and state levels. Recently, 
directly elected local government bodies have also been 
created. In the initial years after independence, the 
Indian National Congress (INC) – the nationalist coalition 
that had won independence – ruled at the center as well as 
the states.  Over time, though, regional parties have risen 
in prominence and, in addition to dominating subnational 
politics in several states, now also hold the balance of 
power in national government coalitions. Economic reforms, 
in the direction of greater market orientation and openness 
to international trade and investment, which began in the 
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 1980s and 1990s, paralleled this gradual process of 
political decentralization. 
India’s initial political centralization was also 
reflected in bureaucratic institutions. The key component 
of the bureaucracy is the Indian Administrative Service 
(IAS), whose members are chosen by a centralized process 
and trained together. Bureaucratic functioning in India is 
relatively transparent and rule-bound, though the 
traditional economic policy approach of central planning 
vested the bureaucracy with considerable discretion in such 
matters. IAS members remain influential at all levels of 
government, in policy making and implementation. 
In 1993, after decades of debate on decentralization, 
two constitutional amendments gave legal recognition, 
enhanced political status, and ostensibly greater 
expenditure responsibilities to urban and rural local 
governments. The impetus came from normative goals of 
promoting greater citizen involvement, national political 
considerations of balancing the power of states that were 
exerting greater autonomy, and hopes for improving the 
quality and effectiveness of public spending by pushing 
decision-making on local public goods down to the local 
level.  
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 The amendments reduced state governments’ 
discretionary control over elections to local government 
bodies (e.g., Rao and Singh, 2003). They also changed tax 
and expenditure assignments to local governments by 
specifying their authority and responsibilities more fully, 
and instituted a formal system of state-local fiscal 
transfers. Problems with the new legislation and its 
implementation include lack of clarity, mismatches between 
revenue and expenditure authority, and lack of local 
administrative capacity.  
  
Responsibilities 
The constitution laid out the areas of responsibility 
of the central and state governments, with respect to 
expenditure authority, revenue-raising instruments, and 
legislation needed to implement either. Expenditure 
responsibilities are specified in separate Union and State 
Lists, with a Concurrent List covering areas of joint 
authority. The major subjects assigned to the states 
include public order, public health, agriculture and 
irrigation. Thus the division of health spending noted in 
Table 2 is an outcome of constitutional assignments. The 
states also assume a significant role for subjects in the 
Concurrent List, such as education and social insurance. 
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 The constitution assigned tax powers by creating 
exclusive tax categories for the center and states.  Most 
broad-based taxes were assigned to the center, including 
taxes on income from non-agricultural sources, corporation 
tax, and customs duty. A long list of taxes was assigned to 
the states, but only the tax on the sale of goods has 
turned out to be significant for revenues.  This narrow 
effective tax base is largely a result of the political 
power of rural landed interests that has eroded the use of 
taxes on agricultural land or incomes.   
The situation with respect to local governments is 
somewhat distinct from the center-state division of powers. 
The 1993 amendments left legislative details to the states, 
since local government was, and remains, in the State List. 
Furthermore most local responsibilities are subsets of 
those in the State List. There is no “Local List,” but the 
constitution now includes separate lists of 
responsibilities and powers of rural and urban local 
governments.3 For example, rural local governments are now 
potentially responsible for “health and sanitation, 
including hospitals, primary health centers and 
dispensaries,” family welfare, and “women and child 
development.” 
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 Actual details of assignment of tax powers and 
expenditure responsibilities to local governments have 
varied across the states. In general, the states have 
chosen to provide limited revenue autonomy to local 
governments, especially rural bodies. Local governments 
also have little legislative autonomy. Thus, neither 
revenue authority nor legislative autonomy has been 
enhanced significantly to match the new political 
decentralization. 
 
Intergovernmental transfers 
The combination of the constitutional assignments of 
tax and expenditure authority, their detailed 
implementation, and the responses of governments and 
taxpayers led to a substantial vertical fiscal imbalance. 
In 2005-2006, the states raised about 38 percent of 
combined government revenues, but incurred about 60 percent 
of expenditures.  Transfers from the center, including tax 
sharing, grants and loans made up most of the difference.  
Local governments are even more dependent on transfers 
from higher levels. In 2002-03, rural local governments’ 
own source revenues were less than 7 percent of their total 
revenue and less than 10 percent of their current 
expenditures. Urban local bodies did somewhat better: they 
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 raised about 58 percent of their revenue and covered almost 
53 percent of their expenditure from own revenue sources. 
Aggregate local government expenditure was only about 5 
percent of total government spending at all levels, while 
local revenue from own sources was only 1 percent of total 
government revenue. 
Fiscal imbalances for state governments were 
anticipated in the constitution, which mandated a Finance 
Commission (FC) that recommends on center-state transfers. 
The FC served as a model for State Finance Commissions 
(SFCs), created in 1993 to recommend on state-local 
transfers. In both cases, other transfer channels also 
exist. The creation of an apparatus of central planning in 
the 1950s led to a complex system of plan transfers 
involving both subnational levels. In addition, intertwined 
with the planning system, there are various specific-
purpose transfers from central and state government 
ministries to lower levels.  
The current constitutional tax sharing arrangement 
entitles the states to an overall share of the consolidated 
fund of India.  The shares of the center and the states, 
and the states’ individual shares are determined by a new 
FC every five years. Tax sharing is unconditional, based on 
an elaborate formula. The FC also recommends grants, 
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 typically based on projected gaps between non-plan current 
expenditures and post-tax devolution revenues. These grants 
are mostly unconditional, although some commissions have 
made closed-ended, specific purpose non-matching grants for 
areas such as health and education.   
A separate body, the Planning Commission (PC), makes 
grants and loans for implementing development plans. The PC 
also coordinates central ministry transfers: almost one-
third of center-state transfers are made through these 
channels. Plan transfers are made using a different formula 
than that of the FC. In contrast to the FC, PC transfers 
are conditional, being earmarked for particular 
“developmental” purposes. The process for determining plan 
transfers involves bargaining between the PC and the 
states.  
Central ministry transfers are categorical, and 
typically made to their counterparts in the states for 
specified projects, with (centrally sponsored schemes) or 
without (central sector projects) state cost sharing. 
Health, education, social insurance and rural 
infrastructure have all received increased attention and 
funding in recent years. However, monitoring and 
coordination of these transfers are relatively ineffective. 
There are well over 100 schemes, and attempts to 
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 consolidate them into broad sectoral programs have been 
unsuccessful. 
The new SFCs, have struggled to create a system of 
formal state-local transfers (Finance Commission, 2004, 
Chapter 8). There are problems with the quality of 
analysis, methodologies used, and implementation of 
transfers in various states. Some states have been slow to 
constitute SFCs, and even ignored their recommendations at 
times. Nevertheless, the new system has made local 
government financing more transparent. Available data 
(Finance Commission, 2004, Chapter 8; World Bank, 2004) 
indicate that rural local governments, in particular, rely 
heavily on grants, often with restrictive conditions 
attached, so measured rural local revenues include a large 
component whose spending is predetermined by higher-level 
agencies (Rajaraman, 2001). 
 
Accountability Mechanisms 
Accountability in governance means that members and 
agents of government (i.e., politicians, employees and 
contractors) are ultimately answerable to the citizens who 
provide the funds for their functioning, through taxes, 
fees and loans. For most components of government, 
accountability is somewhat indirect, operating through 
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 organizational hierarchies. Only politicians are directly 
answerable to citizens through elections, and these are 
based on aggregate and incomplete assessments by citizens 
of politicians’ performance.  
Hierarchical accountability mechanisms have been 
commonly used in India, often operating through national 
political party hierarchies. State-local hierarchical 
accountability in the political arena was much more 
extreme. Before the constitutional amendments on local 
government, provisions for direct rural local elections 
could be and often were ignored at the discretion of state 
governments (Dillinger, 1994).  
In practice, strong hierarchical political control did 
not translate into good performance in delivery of public 
goods and services. Day-to-day accountability mechanisms, 
operating mainly through the bureaucracy, may be more 
important than extreme measures such as dismissal of 
elected governments. States have a reasonably well-defined 
locus of authority, and longstanding, competent 
bureaucracies (the IAS), though corrupt politicians at the 
state level can override internal bureaucratic 
accountability mechanisms. Local governments still lack 
independent bureaucracies, which constrains their ability 
to act, even if funds are available. The central government 
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 and FC have attempted to increase the accountability of 
state governments for local government performance by 
conditioning transfers. The FC has also tried to directly 
support local government capacity building through various 
conditional and unconditional center-local transfers, 
though these must be channeled through the states.  
Democracy provides an alternative to hierarchical 
accountability mechanisms. Theoretical models of the 
democratic political process typically assume 
responsiveness (e.g., Downs, 1957), driven by politicians’ 
preferences for re-election. This responsiveness may be to 
individual voter preferences, or to well-defined interest 
groups, the latter leading to distortions. Chhibber (1995) 
explains the deepening of interest group influence in India 
in terms of the intensifying needs of political 
competition. Political distortions also exist in the 
intergovernmental transfer system (e.g., Rao and Singh, 
2002; Das-Gupta, Dhillon and Dutta, 2004), and in 
subnational spending patterns (e.g., Rao, 1979; Dutta, 
2000). Thus, electoral accountability has not been very 
effective for the delivery of public services.  
However, recent work at the local level indicates that 
decentralization of electoral accountability may improve 
participation, decision-making, and perceptions of quality 
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 of service delivery (e.g., Jha, Rao and Woolcock, 2005; 
Chaudhuri and Heller, 2003; Chaudhuri, 2005; Besley, Pande, 
Rahman and Rao, 2006; and Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). 
Some of this evidence motivates the continued interest in 
decentralization as a means of improving delivery of public 
services such as health care. 
 
4. Implications for Service Delivery 
 Despite elaborate institutional mechanisms within and 
across levels of government in India, service delivery is 
poor at all levels of government (World Bank, 2006). The 
problem is more acute at the subnational level because day-
to-day and basic services, such as health care, education, 
water and sanitation are mainly the responsibility of 
subnational tiers, which are disadvantaged with respect to 
fiscal and administrative capacity. Increases in patronage 
politics and rent-seeking over time have resulted in a 
decline in the quality of public expenditure. Arguably, 
those with the greatest distance (social, political or 
geographical) from the locus of decision-making suffer the 
most, which suggests that reduction of this distance may be 
a beneficial direction of reform. 
There are several kinds of evidence for the poor 
quality of service delivery, including tangible public 
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 goods and services, as well as various forms of social 
insurance. One is measurement of performance and outcomes, 
such as life expectancy or infant mortality. A second is 
evidence based on inputs and processes of government, such 
as corruption, overall spending patterns, and employee 
absenteeism. A third is the response of citizens, through 
exit from the system by use of private alternatives, and 
their voting behavior. 
 Measures of state level human development performance 
provide a first-level indicator of inefficiency, since 
better-performing states provide a standard against which 
others can be judged. Table 3 summarizes the outcomes of 
India’s 14 major states in terms of a Human Development 
Index (Planning Commission, 2002). The HDI aggregates eight 
outcomes, including several indicators or determinants of 
health: per capita expenditure, headcount poverty rate, 
literacy rate, a formal education enrollment index, infant 
mortality rate, life expectancy, access to safe water and 
access to housing constructed with permanent materials. The 
variation in the HDI across states is not decreasing over 
time (Singh et al, 2003). Neither overall nor public sector 
per capita health spending (Table 3) appears to have a 
positive correlation with the HDI. 
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 Second, studies of the functioning of government in 
India suggest pervasive examples of inefficiency in 
processes of public service delivery, including the 
functioning of core administrations, plan and ministry 
projects, and public sector enterprises. For many states, 
subsidies and salaries are taking a larger share of 
expenditure (e.g., Howes and Murgai, 2005), and public 
sector enterprises are over-staffed. Budgeting procedures, 
accounting and auditing methods, personnel policies and tax 
collection can all be improved (Finance Commission, 2004; 
World Bank, 2005), particularly at subnational levels. 
Clearly, these are general reforms that are not restricted 
to health care delivery mechanisms. 
High levels of corruption also contribute to 
inefficiency of public service delivery. Examples include 
industry regulation (Dollar et al., 2002) and state 
government job assignments (Wade, 1985). “Retail 
corruption” is widespread in health care, electric power, 
police and judiciary functions, taxation and land 
administration, and education (Transparency International, 
2002).  
Finally, the low efficiency of delivery of health and 
education in rural areas because of poor performance 
(absenteeism and low effort) by government employees is 
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 well documented (e.g., Drèze and Gazdar, 1996; PROBE, 1999; 
World Bank, 2006; Howes and Murgai, 2005; Chaudhury et al., 
2006; Kremer et al., 2005). There is some evidence that 
institutional innovations that correct frontline provider 
incentives or modify the conditions of provision can 
improve efficiency (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2007; Duflo and 
Hanna, 2005), and that decentralization of accountability 
systems can improve incentives if implemented effectively, 
as in the Madhya Pradesh Education Guarantee Scheme (e.g., 
Sharma and Gopalakrishnan, 2001). However, decentralized 
monitoring is no panacea, since it may be subverted by 
collusion between government employees (e.g., nurses) and 
local administrators or politicians (Duflo, 2008).  
The third indicator of inefficiency in public service 
delivery is private or self-provision. This is natural and 
acceptable if there are income effects (e.g., private vs. 
public transportation) associated with quality of service. 
Thus, the rich may always choose this route for many quasi-
public goods. However, in the Indian case, the middle class 
and poor rely on costly and inefficient methods of private 
provision when public service delivery is poor in quality. 
Household-level generation and storage of electric power 
and private purchase of water from tankers are two 
pervasive examples in India. In this context, the high 
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 proportion of private expenditure on health care in India, 
even by the poorest quintile (Hammer, Aiyar and Samji, 
2006), is a telling indicator of lack of effective public 
sector health care provision. 
In sum, poor quality of public service delivery is 
pervasive in India, including health care, but extending 
across the board to education, social insurance, and 
infrastructure provision. Thus, there must be systemic 
problems that should be traceable to the institutional 
structures summarized in section 3. At the same time, 
health care, because of its complexities and heterogeneous 
components, may present special challenges. The next 
section examines the direction of health care policy, 
including the role of decentralization, before a 
generalization is attempted in the conclusion. 
   
5. Health Care Policy and Decentralization 
The elaborate institutional structure of development 
planning, including public health services, has not been 
able to deliver good outcomes for the rural populations of 
India that need it most. In the introduction, a 2001 
document from the PC was quoted, noting the lack of 
accountability, leading to pervasive absenteeism and low 
effort, and offering decentralization as a solution. Five 
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 years later (Planning Commission, 2006), however, the same 
problems were highlighted once more: “Rural health care in 
most states is marked by absenteeism of doctors/health 
providers, low levels of skills, shortage of medicines, 
inadequate supervision/monitoring, and callous attitudes. 
There are neither rewards for service providers nor 
punishments to defaulters.”    
The government’s own analysis identified a failure to 
decentralize enough as the reason for lack of improved 
health outcomes, “The 10th Plan aimed at providing 
essential primary health care, particularly to the 
underprivileged and underserved segments of our population. 
It also sought to devolve responsibilities and funds for 
health care to PRIs. However, progress towards these 
objectives has been slow and the 10th Plan targets … have 
been missed” (Planning Commission, 2006). 
A major policy response to the failures in public 
health services delivery was to launch a “National Rural 
Health Mission.” Elements of this initiative were 
integrated district health plans, including “effective 
integration of health concerns with determinants of health 
like safe drinking water, sanitation and nutrition;” 
partnership with NGOs; flexible funds for state and local 
governments; appointment of an Accredited Social Health 
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 Activist (ASHA) in each village; and “strengthening of 
public health infrastructure.” There was also discussion of 
regulating the private sector to improve equity and reduce 
out of pocket expenses, and introduction of effective risk 
pooling mechanisms and social health insurance.  
In some ways, the response to failure of 
implementation in targeted areas of policy was counter-
intuitive, trying to do even more, and to operate on a 
broader front. The so-called integrated policy for public 
health services delivery seemed to veer toward a “kitchen-
sink” approach, failing to address the different needs of 
different dimensions of health care. Thus, communicable 
disease control may require more centralized provision than 
basic curative care or reproductive services. It is also 
not clear that the district (the level of rural government 
directly below the state) is necessarily better than the 
state for coordinating different aspects of health policy 
and spending (Hammer, Aiyar and Samji, 2006). 
 Putting aside the complex issues of different 
dimensions of health needs, and just focusing on the idea 
that accountability requires adequate incentive provision, 
one can argue that the National Rural Health Mission does 
not address the fundamental structural issues with respect 
to past failures. First, intergovernmental transfers, even 
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 when meant to be untied or flexible, fail to be so in 
practice. State governments often impose conditions on 
transfers to local governments that come from the FC, and 
are meant to be unconditional. Local governments are also 
often denied funds to which they are entitled, through long 
delays in release of the money by the state governments.4 
Unfortunately, the central government lacks the power or 
control mechanisms to change this situation. 
 A second issue for decentralization is with respect to 
the monitoring and reward systems required for 
accountability. Even if funds are nominally devolved to 
local governments, they may not be in a position to alter 
the incentive systems operating for public employees such 
as health workers and teachers, who may collude with local 
government officials (Duflo, 2008), or still be immune from 
suffering any penalties for non-performance, even if they 
are local rather than state employees. The evidence on 
impacts of decentralization on public service delivery, 
briefly reviewed in the last section, finds positive 
results for welfare programs, which may be more easily 
monitored by citizens than health care delivery. To extend 
the benefits of decentralization, functions and 
functionaries may also need to be decentralized as well as 
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 funds. In other words, expenditure autonomy and revenue 
autonomy must go hand in hand. 
 A third issue with respect to decentralization is 
whether local governments have the capacity and the ability 
to make efficient decisions on behalf of their 
constituents. This may be a particularly challenging 
problem for complex services such as health care. Community 
halls are much easier to build and even maintain, as 
compared to the ongoing delivery of even simple curative 
health care. A more general problem of capacity is the lack 
of accounting systems: in this case also, FC allocations 
for this purpose have not been effectively utilized 
(Finance Commission, 2004), probably because of 
disinterested or recalcitrant state governments.  
Local governments may also lack the bargaining power 
to obtain such services at reasonable cost. In this 
context, Hammer, Aiyar and Samji (2006) suggest that local 
governments could form consortia to contract for health 
care services from outside providers such as NGOs. There is 
evidence from other countries (Bhushan et al., 2007) that 
contracting out provides some improvement in outcomes 
through better incentives. The role of decentralization in 
this case is in increasing the possibility of effective 
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 choice and competition, compared to more centralized 
contracting. 
 Centralized knowledge generation and information 
provision with respect to health care best practice, 
provider quality, and health outcomes is an essential, and 
somewhat neglected complement to any decentralization of 
delivery. Policy-makers arguably fail to appreciate the 
need to improve information flows and lower the transaction 
costs of information exchange: this could be done through 
use of information technology, for example. There are some 
examples in rural health care, but they appear to be 
isolated applications.5  
In fact, the spirit of the latest policy initiatives 
appears to be more in the direction of centralized 
coordination, rather than providing centralized 
infrastructure to improve information, combined with 
decentralization of funds, monitoring authority and 
expenditure autonomy to improve incentives. This is 
arguably a general failure of the implementation of 
decentralization to the local level in India, not 
restricted to public delivery of health care services. In 
this view, the problems are incomplete decentralization in 
several dimensions, and a lack of requisite capacity 
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 building, both directly at the local level, and in central 
support systems for local government. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Poor quality and inefficient delivery of public 
services in India are pervasive problems, not just 
restricted to health care. Part of the problem lies in weak 
accountability mechanisms for individuals (politicians and 
government employees) and for organizations (ministries and 
various public sector enterprises). Recent empirical 
evidence suggests that decentralization has improved local 
responsiveness, targeting and service delivery in some 
cases. 
However, political decentralization alone is likely to 
have limited benefits, unless accompanied by 
decentralization of funds, functions and functionaries. For 
complex, heterogeneous services such as health care, 
building local capacity is also a critical prerequisite for 
successful decentralization, which improves service 
delivery. Some health care components that are subject to 
economies of scale or spillovers may not be candidates for 
decentralization. In all cases, better information flows 
and centralized databases are important adjuncts for 
decentralized provision. This paper has argued that the 
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 case for decentralization in recent Indian policy making on 
health care has not been conceptualized clearly. Neither 
has the manner of implementation, through district level 
plans. 
More generally, it can be argued that all subnational 
governments in India have to rely too heavily on transfers 
from higher-level governments.  These transfers can be 
uncertain, and restricted in ways that make their effective 
use difficult. Conditional transfers are typically poorly 
monitored. Centralized taxation and large transfers also 
destroy the linkage between benefits and costs for 
beneficiaries of public expenditure on service delivery. 
Hence, a more radical reform than increasing the 
flexibility of transfers would be to reduce the need for 
transfers by decentralizing some kinds of tax authority 
(Singh, 2006).  
The case can also be made that, since many of the 
problems of effective local decentralization flow from the 
poor functioning of the states’ political and 
administrative machinery, giving the states a firmer 
footing for their own revenues would allow them to address 
local government effectiveness in a less constrained 
manner. Paradoxically, a national goal of improving rural 
health outcomes may be achieved by increasing the fiscal 
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 capacity of state governments, while simultaneously putting 
the onus on them to carry out their constitutional 
responsibilities for health care. 
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Table 1: Comparative Health Indicators, 2003 
 
Low 
Income 
India China Middle 
Income 
Births attended by 
skilled health staff 
(% of total) 
 42.5* 96  
Immunization, measles 
(% of children ages 
12-23 months) 
61.52 56 84 86.43 
Life expectancy at 
birth, total (years) 58.62 63.42 71.05 69.73 
Mortality rate, infant 
(per 1,000 live 
births) 
83.88* 64** 33* 35.4 
Mortality rate, under-
5 (per 1,000) 127.66* 94* 41* 45.18 
GNI per capita, Atlas 
method (current US$) 438.53 530 1270 1938.11 
 
*Year 2000, ** Year 2002 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 
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 Table 2: Patterns of Public Health Spending 2001-02  
State Central State Local 
(Rural) 
Local 
(Urban)
  
    
Health spending by funds 
source*(Rs. Billion) 
67.1 132.7 4.7 9.7 
Health spending by 
channel**(Rs. Billion) 
53.5 173.1 15.3 16.5 
Spending categories*** 
(percentages) 
    
Curative  29.4 47.6 29.8 41.4 
Reproductive and child 
health 
21.8 12.2 17.1 3.3 
Communicable disease 
control 
14.1 6.2 35.2 14.1 
Medical education and 
training 
11.9 8.7 0.3 2.4 
R&D 11.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Administration 4.6 8.4 8.6 27.1 
Capital expenditure 1.0 4.7 4.9 4.3 
 
Source: Government of India (2005) 
Notes: *Excludes Rs. 24.8 billion external support, of 
which Rs. 19.7 billion was to governments, and the 
rest to NGOs 
**Includes spending by non-health ministries and 
agencies 
***Only Ministry of Health and Family Welfare for 
Central government, and health ministries for states  
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 Table 3: State Level Human Development Indices 
State 1981 1981 1991 1991 2001 2001 2001-02 health spending 
 Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank  Total(Rs. 
per capita) 
Public (%)
  
      
  
Kerala 0.500 1 0.591 1 0.638 1 1,858 12.9 
Punjab 0.411 2 0.475 2 0.537 2 1,530 16.8 
Tamil Nadu 0.343 7 0.466 3 0.531 3 846 23.9 
Maharashtra 0.363 3 0.452 4 0.523 4 1,011 19.4 
Haryana 0.360 5 0.443 5 0.509 5 1,570 10.4 
Gujarat 0.360 4 0.431 6 0.479 6 816 18.0 
Karnataka 0.346 6 0.412 7 0.478 7 712 28.9 
West Bengal 0.305 8 0.404 8 0.472 8 775 23.4 
Rajasthan 0.256 11 0.347 10 0.424 9 597 30.4 
Andhra Pradesh 0.298 9 0.377 9 0.416 10 1,039 17.5 
Orissa 0.267 10 0.345 11 0.404 11 582 23.0 
Madhya Pradesh 0.245 13 0.328 12 0.394 12 864 15.2 
Uttar Pradesh 0.255 12 0.314 13 0.388 13 1,124 7.5 
Bihar 0.237 14 0.308 14 0.367 14 779 11.8 
All India 0.302  0.381  0.472    
 
        
 
Sources: Planning Commission (2002), Singh and Srinivasan 
(2005), Government of India (2005). 
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∗
 This paper draws on work for a World Bank project assessing the 
impacts of subnational decentralization in India, and on my previous 
research, particularly coauthored work with M. Govinda Rao and T.N. 
Srinivasan. I am grateful to them both for the insights they have 
provided me in our collaborations. I am also grateful to Jonathan 
Rodden for his guidance and comments on the World Bank project. None of 
them, nor the World Bank or affiliated institutions is responsible for 
any errors or omissions, or the judgments and opinions expressed here.  
†
 Contact information: Email, boxjenk@ucsc.edu; Phone, 831-459-4093.  
1
 These problems are not insurmountable: see, for example, Dulleck and 
Kerschbamer (2006). 
2
  This section is based on Rao and Singh (2005), which provides detailed 
analysis and data on all aspects of India’s federal system. 
3
 The Union, State and Concurrent Lists are in the Seventh Schedule, 
whereas the new responsibilities of rural and urban local governments 
are in the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules, added through the 1993 
amendments. 
4
 These points are made categorically in the report of the 12th Finance 
Commission (Finance Commission, 2004), in Chapter 8. 
5
 The India Health Care project in Andhra Pradesh (funded by the infoDev 
project of the World Bank) has used customized PDAs provided to the 
field staff of public health centers for medical database construction 
and patient tracking (Sastry, 2003). Health mapping exercises for 
information kiosks in Kerala are described in Parthasarathy et al. 
(2005). 
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